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SITUATION II 
.. ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURES AND MARITIME 
JURISDICTION 
States X and Y are at 'var. Other states are neutral. 
(a) A merchant vessel of state N, the Nagle, is an-
chorecl in the lee of and 1,000 feet fron1 a lighthouse of 
stateR. The lighthouse is 14 n1iles off the coast of state 
Rand is built upon a reef always submerged. A cruiser 
of state X, the Xanthos, approaches and is about to visit 
and search the LVagle, when vessels of war of states N 
and R. appear and the Nagle calls upon both for protec-
tion. 
(b) State R has also established a landing station for 
aircraft built upon a submerged reef 20 miles fro In any 
land. ''T ould the sa1ne solution as for (a) hold in case 
the LVagle 'vas anchored off this station. 
(c) State R has also established a floating landing 
station for aircraft anchored to a submerged reef 20 
1niles from any land. 'V ould the same solution as for 
(a) hold" in case the Nagle w·as tied to the floating land-
ing station? 
(d) StateR has filled in a strip of shallow water out 
:from its coast a distance of 5 miles, thus making a nar-
row causeway to a landing station for aircraft. The 
station is built upon a reef 'vhich is always submergec. 
Would the same solution as for (a) hold in case the 
Nagle was sailing within 1 1nile of the causeway but 
4lh miles from the mainland of R ~ 
(e) Ho\v should an aircraft of Y be treated by: ( 1) 
a cruiser of X, and (2) by a military aircraft of X 
when not more than 3 miles from the landing station 
mention€cl in (b), the floating landing station men-
tioned in (c) and the cause"ray mentioned in (d) 1 
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SOLUTION 
(a) The visit and search o£ the neutral merchant ves-
sel is la w£ul, as there is no terri to rial sea around the 
lighthouse built upon a subn1erged ree£ 14 miles £rom 
any coast. No protection other than to assure the la \V-
£ul exercise o£ the visit and search should be given to 
the Nagle. 
(b) The visit and search o£ the neutral merchant ves-
sel is la w£ul, as there is no terri to rial sea around the 
landing station £or aircraft built upon a submerged ree£ 
20 miles £rom any land. No protection other than to 
assure the law£ul exercise o£ the visit and search should 
be given by neutral vessels o£ war to the Nagle. 
(c) The visit and search o£ the Nagle tied to an an-
chored landing station £or aircraft o£ R is law£ul, as 
there is no territorial sea around the landing station £or 
aircraft 20 miles £rom any land. No protection other· 
than to assure the law£ul exercise o£ the visit and search 
should be given to the Nagle. 
(d) 1~he visit and search o£ the neutral merchant ves-
sel w·ithin 1 mile o£ a causeway built out £rom shore to 
a landing station £or aircraft is not law£ul, as the mer-
chant vessel is within territorial sea and the vessel of 
,\.,ar o£ R should afford protection against any. violation 
of the neutrality o£ state R, and should protect the mer-
chant vessel against any Yiolation o£ its rights within 
these waters. 
(e) All enemy aircraft are liable to capture i£ non--
military, or to attack i£ military, when not on or over 
the landing station mentioned in (b) or (c). Enemy 
aircraft may not be lawfully captured or attacked when 
\vithin 3 miles of the causeway or landing station men-
tioned in (d) but should be interned. 
NOTES 
High sea:s.-The rights of states and o£ persons in re-
gard to the high seas has been a matter o£ differing 
opinion and practice from early times. This is under--
HIGI-I SEA 55 
standable 'vhen the nature of the sea and its varied 
uses are considered. When the sea is regarded as the 
barrier against invasion, the attitude 'vould be different 
fro1n that at a time when the sea is regarded as a high-
'\vay· bet,veen countries. There would also be the differ .. 
ences due to interest in the seas as a source of food supply 
and as the 'vay of com1nerce. The theories and conten-
tions of Grotius in Mare Liberum, 1608, made clear the 
demand for freedom of the sea 'vhich Selden in Mare 
Clausu1n, 1635, tried to meet by somewhat exaggerated~ 
though ably presented, pretentious of England for n 
closed sea. 
A survey of the Inaterial .relating to the control and 
use of the sea sho,vs the influence of national interests 
upon the views sustained which range from that of ex-
clusive proprietary rights to the denial of any control. 
The clai1n to exclusive property in the sea 'vas gradually 
abandoned, but other interests remained which could not 
be abandoned. It had been found that many pretensions 
nnd paper claims embodied in proc1amations and decrees 
Y\-"'ere not worth maintaining. There was, therefore, 
growing willingness to accept Bynk.ershoek's proposal of 
1702 that the authority of the state over the sea should 
extend to the effective range of the cannon, which at that 
time 'vas esti1nated to be 3 1niles. The 3-mile lin1it be-
<'HJne In ore and In ore conventionalized but was not uni-
-versally accepted even at the Hague Codification Con-
-ference in 1930. 
Use of the sea.-vVhile there are differing theories as 
~o the nature of 1nariti1ne rights, there is a general agree-
Jnent that innocent use o£ the sea is common to all. 
\Vhat the li1nits of innocent use are is debatable and has 
~:roused controversies. Some of the controversies have 
-1 >een settled by the course o£ events without any for1nal 
~J.bandonment of positions assun1ed by any party; others 
ltave resu1 ~d . 1 treaty a(rrt> Ll~ll f'll 
J 1 nderstandings. In general, it may be said that use, as 
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i n navigation, is accepted as a right of all; and abuses, 
as by pollution, is denied as generally injurious. 
In concrete instances, such as the laying of submarine 
cables, there is an admitted innocent use which may be 
supported against negligent use such as careless drag-
ging of an anchor upon the sea bottom in a submarine 
cable area, or there may be an admitted abuse such as 
in the case of piracy, or a conventional abuse as in slave 
trade. 
The problem of use anu abuse in time of war differs 
ntaterially from the same problem in time of peace, and 
belligerent use differs from neutral use. The limits of 
territorial jurisdiction are not changed by virtue of use 
or abuse of the sea in time of peace or in time of war 
though the rights of use may be modified. 
Aids to navigation.-While islands as products of nat-
ural forces are generally appropriated, artificial struc-
tures have a status differing somewhat according to cir-
cumstances. 
The free use of the sea by all under ordinary condi-
tions is now admitted. Ships may sail at will on the 
high sea. That they may sail safely, it is essential that 
dangerous places be marked. That the voyage 1nay be 
convenient and profitable, it is essential that routes be 
buoyed and lighted and that depths be known. For such 
purposes national agencies have been permitted to assun1e 
a degree of jurisdiction outside their maritime limits. 
States have built and maintained lighthouses on reefs 
well beyond their maritime jurisdiction and have marked 
channels in the high seas. They serve the general good 
but may specially benefit the state which has undertaken 
their construction and maintenance. It may be true that 
the locating in the high seas of some aid to navigation 
may modify the path of commerce and benefit one state 
at the cost. of another, but if it is for the general good, 
the action of the state benefited will often be approved 
as setting an example to other states. 
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Gene1"a.l considera.tions.-All states have a common 
right to use the high seas for navigation and to a share 
in its resources. Long and unopposed appropriation of 
the products of the sea by a state in a certain area may 
lead other states to acquiesce in the claim of exclusive 
use, or treaties bet,veen states may voluntarily regulate 
the use of the high sea or its resources so far as the 
states parties to the treaties are concerned. 
Extension of authority beyond the territorial sea has 
been tolerated in certain cases as a measure of protection 
in such instances as in the establishing of defense areas 
adjacent to fortifications or for strategic reasons. The 
placing of lighthouses, buoys, etc., 'vhich serve all alike 
has beco1ne customary and the state which has con-
structed and placed thelighthouse or buoy has admittedly 
the jurisdiction over it, but it is now generally main-
tained that the jurisdiction of the state does not extend 
beyond the lighthouse itself into the surrounding high 
sea. Perhaps it might be affir1ned that artificial struc-
tures built in the high seas do not extend the area of 
the terri to rial sea of the state placing the structure, 
while structures built out fron1 the land 1nay extend the 
coast line and correspondingly extend the territorial sea 
Ineasured from that line. Areas appearing above. the 
surface of the sea from natural causes have been re-
garded as belonging to the nearby state as in the case 
of the Anna, 1805 ( 5 C. Robinson 373), when the British 
Court held that mud islands formed at the mouth of the 
Mississippi River were American territory and that 
jurisdiction extended 3 miles from these islands. Islands 
discovered in the high seas at a distance from .land be-
long to the discoverer if they are subsequently occupied 
or if steps are taken for effective occupation. 
Suggestions as to jurisdiction.-V arious suggestions 
have been made from time to time as to jurisdiction over 
"airports in the high seas", "floating islands", "marine 
bases for aircraft ", " sea bases for aircraft ", " sea-
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dromes ", or over such contrivances under some other 
title. In 1925 the American Institute of International 
Law put forth what is called a project in regard to 
jurisdiction, of which articles 13 and 14 were as follows: 
.ARTICLE 13. 
The American Republics whose coasts are washed by the waters 
of the sea and which possess a navy or 1nercantile marine, shall 
haYe the right to occupy an extent of the high sea contiguous 
to their respective territorial sea necessary for the establishment 
of the following more or less permanent installations, provided 
they are in the general interest: 
1. Bases for nonmilitary airships and dirigibles ; 
2. \Vireless telegraph stations; 
3. Stations for submarine cables; 
4. Lighthouses ; 
5. Stations for scientific exploration; 
6. Refuge stations for the shipwrecked. 
ARTICLE 14 
It is expressly forbidden to fortify the installations referred 
to in the preceding article and to use them, even indirectly, ns 
bases of supply for warships, military airplanes and dirigibles, 
or for submarines. (20 American Journal International Law, 
Sve·cial Supplement, 19'26,. tJ. 325.) 
'fhis subject had been 1nentioned in Professor Schiick-
ing's report to the League of Nations Committee on 
Territorial Waters. He said: 
As regards islands which are artificially created by anchorage 
to the bed of the sea, and which have no solid connection with 
the bed of the sea, but which are employed for the establi~hment 
of a firm foundation, e.g., for enterprises designed to facilitate 
aerial navigation, we must be guided by the vie'v that such an 
enterprfse cannot claim that a special zone of territorial sea is 
constituted round such artificial island. Such fictitious islands 
must lJe assimilated to vessels voyaging on the high seas. 
It has been discussed whether a zone of territorial sea should 
be established around artificial islands which are actually con-
nected with the bottom, such as islands designed to carry light-
houses ; there is no uniform legal doctrine as regards such island~. 
This i~ evident fron1 the fact that two such e1ninent authorit-ies 
,. 
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as the English judge, Lord Russell, and the~ jurist, 1\1. L. Oppen-
heim, have expressed divergent views. 
Lord Russell states: " If a lighthouse is built upon a rock or 
upon piles driven into the sea, it becomes, as far as that light-
house is concerned, part of the territory of the nation which llns 
erected it." Oppenheiln says : " Il n'y pas de droHs de· souv-
erainete sur une zone de la mer que baigne les ph ares." (Ibid., 
p. 87.) 
After discussion no mention of this subject appeared 
in the amended draft. 
The circulation of aircraft in relation to the high sea 
'Yas a particular subject of discussion at the Neuvieme 
Congres International de Legislation Aerienne in 1930. 
After several days of discussion, the follo,ving text was 
adopted: 
AEROPORTS DE HA UT'EI l\1EIR 
ARTIC'LE PR.EMIER,.-Aucun aeroport de haute mer, cree pour les 
hesoins de la navigation aerienne, qu'il soit la propriete d'un 
particulier ou d'un Etat, ne peut etre etabli en haute mer autre-
ment que sous l'autorite et la responsabilite d'un Etat, que ce 
dernier ait nn littoral maritime on non. 
ART. 2.-L~Etat sous l'autorite duquel se trouve place cet aero-
port de haute mer en regie les conditions d'acces et d'exploitation. 
Si l'aeroport de haute 1ner est ouvert a l'usage public, aucune 
discrimination ne peut etre faite, au point de vue de l'acces, sur 
la base de la nationalite. 
ART. 3.-Les Etats doivent porter reciproquement a leur con-
naissance leurs projects de creation d'aeroports de haute rner. 
Au cas ofl dans un delai a determiner quelque Etat s'y opposait 
le differend serait porte devant la Societe des Nations et tranche 
par elle. 
Si pour une raison quelconque la Societe des Nations ne pou-
Yait etre· utile·menLsaisie-ou si elle ne parvenait pas a regler le 
oifferend-les parties seront tenues de re·courir a la procedure de 
!'arbitrage obligatoire. (9 Congr·es International de Legislation 
Aerienne, p. 233.) 
While certain propositions in regard to the treatment 
of seadromes in time of war had been before the Con-
gress, no conclusions ·were agreed to as a result of the 
deliberations. 
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R esolutions, Budapest, 1930.-At the ninth meeting of 
the Co mite J uridique International de !'Aviation at 
Budapest, October 1, 1930, certain resolutions 'vere also, 
after discussion, adopted. These were as follows: 
ARTIOLE PREMIER.-Aucun aeroport flottant, Cree pour les 
besoins de la navigation aerienne, qu'il soit la propriete d'un par-
ticulier ou d'un Etat, ne peut etre etabli en haute mer, autre-
ment que sous l'autorite et la responsabilite d'un Etat, que ce 
dernier ait un littoral maritime ou non. 
ART. 2.-L'Etat sous l'autorite duquel se trouve place cet 
aeroport flottant en regle les conditions d'acces et d'exploitation. 
Si l'aeroport flottant est ouvert a l'usage public, aucune dis-
crimination ne peut etre faite, au point de vue de l'acceS', sur la 
base de la nationalite. 
ART. 3.-Les: Etats. doivent porter reciproquement a leur con-
naissance leurs projets de creation d'aeroports flottants. 
Au cas ou dans un delai a determiner quelque Etat s'y oppo-
serait, le differend serait porte devant la Societe des Nations 
et tranche par eUe. 
Si, pour une raison quelconque, la Societe des Nations ne 
pouvait etre utilement saisie-ou si elle ne parvenait pas a 
regler le differend-les parties seront tenues de recourir a la 
procedure de !'arbitrage obligatoire. 
ART. 4.-En temps de guerre, un aeroport de haute mer ne peut 
etre l'objet ni de capture, ni de deroutement. Toutefois, quand 
l'aeroport releve de l'un des belligerants, !'autre peut le faire 
passer sous son autorite. 
En aucun cas il n'est permis a l'un des belligerants de convertir 
un aeroport neutre en base aero-navale. Un tel usage engagerait, 
conformement aux principes generaux de la neutralite, la res-
ponsabilite de l'Etat qui a autorite sur l'aeroport de haute mer. 
(XV Droit Aerien, p. 24.) 
Dis·qussion in the I nstitut de Droit International, 
1913.-In 1913 the Institut de Droit International dis-
cussed the subject of maritime jurisdiction. Sir Thomas 
Barclay and Prof. L. Oppenheim made the report, but 
they were not in entire accord. In the report of Profes-
sor Oppenheim was also pointed out some questions 
relating to jurisdiction over lighthouses: 
Ayant discute les trois articles de l'avant-proje·t de Sir T. 
Barclay sur lesquels je ne suis P<?int d'accord avec lui, je voudrais 
maintenant attirer !'attention sur un point important qui n'est 
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pas mentionne dans Je rapport de Sir T. Barclay, c'est-a-dire, la 
question des phares batis sur des rochers ou des banes de mer. 
C'est une regie fixe que la zone de la mer territoriale doit etre 
mesuree a partir de la laisse de basse maree de la cote, que cette 
cote soit celle de la terre ferme ou celle d'une ile situee dans 
la zone de la mer territoriaJe de la terre ferme, ou la cote d'une 
ile situee dans la haute mer et occupee par un Etat. La ques-
tion se pose done de savoir si un phare bati sur un rocher ou sur 
un bane de mer submerge, dans la haute mer ou dans la mer 
territoriale, doit etre con·sidere comme si c'etait une ile, de sorte 
que l'Etat possesseur du phare aurait un droit de souverainete 
sur une mer territoriale a l'entour de ce phare. 
Ce point est de haute importance, car beaucoup de phares sont 
batis sur des rocher's ou sur des piles enfoncees dans le lit de la 
mer en dehors de la mer territoriale. Par example, le fameux 
phare d'Eddystone dans la l\1anche est a quatorze milles de la 
cote du Devonshire. (26 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit Inter-
national p. 408.) 
Professor Oppenheim then refers to the position of 
Sir Charles Russell in the Bering Sea Arbitration 'vhich 
is not entirely clear and says-
Si cette assertion de Sir Charles Russell etait juste, il serait 
necessaire d'accorder a tout Etat qui a bati un tel phare un 
droit de souverainete sur la mer territoriale entourant ce phare; 
mais, a mon sens, cette assertion n'est pas justifiee. J e crois 
que !'assimilation des phares aux iles est de nature a induire en 
erreur, et qu'il vaudrait mieux traiter les phares sur le meme 
pied que les bateaux-phares amarres. De meme qu'un Etat n'a 
pas le pouvoir de reclamer souverainete sur une mer territoriale a 
l'entour d'un bateau-phare amarre, de meme il n'a pas le pouvoir 
de reclamer cette souverainet~e ·sur une zone maritime a l'entour 
d'un phare dans la mer. 
Pour cette raison, je proposerais d'ajouter a l'article ler de 
l'avant-projet l'alinea 3 qui suit: " II n'y a pa·s de droit de souver-
ainet~e sur une zone de la mer qui baigne les phares." (Ibid., 
p. 410.) 
Acquisition of island jurisdiction.-Where an island is 
discovered and occupied, it is commonly considered as 
being under the jurisdiction of the state of the flag of 
the discoverer and occupier if it is outside the maritime 
limits of any other state. Even if an island should be 
thrown up by volcanic or other force, the state of the 
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discoverer 'vould have valid clain1 to jurisdiction. This 
practice o£ appropriation by the discoverer and occupier 
has long- been recognized. 
lVhat is an island?-It is generally admitted that ter-
ritorial sea 1nay be claimed around an island to be meas-
ured as £ro1n the mainland. 
In the general observations submitted by governments 
which beca1ne the bases o£ discussion £or the League o£ 
Nations Conference £or the Codification o£ International 
La 'v, there \Vere replies to the question, what is meant 
by an island in considering its relation to territorial 
waters? 
The reply o£ Great Britain, with 'vhich other states 
o£ the British Cominon,vealth o£ N atjons generally 
agreed, vvas as £ollo,vs : 
An island is a piece of territory surrounded by ·water and in 
normal circumstances permanently above high water. It does 
not include a piece of territory not capable of effective occupa-
tion and use. 
His l\1ajesty's Government consider that there is no groutHl 
for clain1ing that a belt of territorial "\Vaters exists round rocks 
and banks not constituting islands as defined above, and would 
view with favour an international agreement to this effect in 
order that there 1nay be no doubt as to the status of the waters 
round such rocks and banks and round artificial structures raised 
upon thetn. (Conference for the Codification of Int. Law. League 
of Nations. C. 74 l\1. 39, 1929, V., vol. II, p. 53.) 
This British view would .not merely deny territorial 
waters £or artificial structures but also certain rocks and 
banks. 
The German reply gave a different point o£ vie'v: 
The Gennan Govennnent considers that the geographical notion 
of an "island", which is taken a~ the basis in the preparation 
of maritime charts, covers all the characteristics of a natural 
island J. any land which emerges from the sea ancl is dry at 
the level adopted in the chart must therefore be reg-arded as a 
natural island. -The claim occasionally advanced that anchored 
buoys, and in particular lightships, snould be regarded as 
" islands " wo\1Id seein to be indefensible. It should therefore 
be laid down that artificial islands ·(artificial constructions) 
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should be assimilated to natural islands, provided that they rest 
on the sea bottom and have hu1nan inhabitants. (Ibid., p. 52.) 
The Gern1an reply accordingly assimilates inhabited 
artificial constructions resting on the sea botton1 to 
natural islands. 
De1unark introduces certain conditions as to the ex-
tension of j uriscliction by artificial structures. 
In lletermiuing the extent of the territorial waters around the· 
coast, account is also taken of islands and reefs, as has been 
stated in paragraph IY (a). The same rule applies to artificial 
islands, lig~1thouses, etc., when determining the breadth of the· 
territorial b('lt towards the open sea. 
Where the territorial waters of two states are in contact, 
ucither of them would be entitleLl to nwllify the existing delhnita-
tion to the prejudice of tlle other, by the construction of artifidal 
i~lands, lighthouses, etc. (Ibid., p. 52.) 
'rhe Nether lands proposed the following : 
an island should be understood to be any natural or artificial 
elevation of the sea bott01n above the surface of the sea at lo\V 
tide. (Ibid., p. 50.) 
This point o£ view does not distinguish between natural 
and artificial eleYations provided that they are exposed 
at lo'v tide. 
Rtunania went further in its inclusive categories, 
saying, 
by an island slwuld be understood a land surface, rocky or 
otherwise, covered or not covered by water, connected or uncon-
nected with the continent, over which it is impossible to navigate. 
(Ibid., p. 53.) 
The Conunittee in preparing the Basis £or Discussion, 
in vie'v of the replies, 1nade no reference as to artificial 
structures but forn1ulated the follo\ving: 
In order that an island may have its own territorial waters, 
it is necessary that it sllould be permanently above the level of 
high tide. 
In order that an island lying within the territorial waters of 
another island or of the mainland 1nay be taken into account in 
determining the belt of such territorial waters, it is sufficient for 
tile island to be above water at low tide. (Ibid., p. 54.) 
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'fhe result o:f the consideration by the Second Com-
mission o:f the Conference of 1930 was: 
Every island has its own territorial sea. An island is an area 
of land, surrounded by water, which is permanently above high-
water mark. 
OBSERVATIONS. 
The definition of the term " island " does not exclude artificial 
islands, provided these are true portions of the territory and not 
merely floating works, anchored buoys, etc. The case of an 
artificial island erected near to the line of de1na rcation between 
the territorial waters of two countries is reserYed. (League of 
Nations Documents, C. 230. M. 117. 1930. V., p. 13.) 
rfhis statement does not make clear ·what \VOUld be the 
attitude upon artificial islands in general, but merely 
makes somewhat indefinite re:ferences to islands, " true 
portions o:f the territory." 
Lighthouses, 189.3.-In the Argu1nent o:f the United 
States in the Fur Seal Arbitration, 1893, a question was 
incidentally raised in regard to lighthouses. 
If a light-house were erected by a nation in waters outside of 
the" three-mile line, for the benefit of its own commerce and that 
of the \Yorld, if so1ne pursuit for gain on the adjacent high sea 
should be discovered which would obscure the light or endanger 
the light-house or the lives of its ilnnates, would that Govern-
ment be defenseless? (9 Fur Seal Arbitration, Argument of the 
United States, p. 176.) 
Sir Charles Russell re:ferring to this and to questions 
raised as he discussed the point in his oral argtunent said: 
'Veil, it is a very difficult case to realize \vhat is really meant" by 
that. For instance, I cannot quite realize how a pursuit of fish-
ing on the high sea could, except by so1ne stretch of imagination 
of which I am not capable, require the obscurity of the light of 
a 1ight-house, or endanger the light-house or the lives of its in-
mat~s; but I wish to point out that I think my friend has, for 
the mmnent forgotten, that if a light-house is built upon a rock 
or upon· piles driven into the bed of the sea. it becmnes, as far 
as that light-house is concerned, part of the territory of the 
nation \Yhich has erected it, and, as part of the territory of the 
nation which has erected it, it has, incident to it, all the rights 
that belong to the protection of territory-no n1ore and no less. 
1\fr. PHELPS. If it should be fi ,~e miles out, 
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Sir CHARLEs RussiDLL. Certainly, undoubtedly. The most im-
portant light houses in the \Vorld are outside the 3 mile limit. 
Lord HANNEN. The great Eddystone Light-house, 14 miles off 
the land, is built on the bed of a rock. 
Sir CHAR.LES RussELL. That point has never been doubted; and 
if it were there is ample authority to support it. The right to 
acquire by the construction of a light-bouse on a rock in mid-
ocean a territorial right in respect of the space so occupied is 
undoubted; and therefore I answer my friend's case by saying 
that ordinary territorial law would apply to it-there is no reason 
why any different territorial law should apply. 
Then n1y friend proceeds : 
"Lord Chief Justice Cockburn answers this inquiry in the case 
of Queen v. Keyn above cited (p. 198) when he declares that such 
encroachments upon the high sea would form a part of the de-
fence of a country, and 'come within the principle that a nation 
may do what is necessary for the protection of its own territory.' " 
The passage which I conceive my friend was referring to, is a 
passage which, like _that from Azuni, requires, in order to under-
stand it, the whole passage to be reacl. I am reading now from 
page 58 of a printed report of the Judgment of Lord Chief Justice 
Cockburn. 
"It does not appear to n1e that the argument for the prosecution 
is advanced by reference to encroachn1ents on the sea, in the way 
of harbours, piers, break-waters, light houses, and the like, even 
when projected into the open sea, or of forts erected in it, as is 
the case in the Solent. Where the sea, or the bed on which it 
rests, can be physically occupied permanently, it may be made 
subject to occupation in the same n1anner as unoccupied territory. 
In point of fact, such encroachments are generally made for the 
benefit of the navigation; and are therefore readily, acquiesced 
in. Or they are for the purposes of defence, and come· within the 
principle that a nation n1ay do what is necessary for the protec-
tion of its own territory. Whether if an encroachment on the sea 
were such as to obstruct the navigation, to the ships of other 
nations, it would not amount to a just cause of complaint, as 
inconsistent with international rights, might, if the case arose, 
be deserving of serious consideration. That such encroachments 
are occasionally made seems to me to fall very far short of estab-
lishing such an exclusive property in the littoral sea as that, in 
the absence of legislation, it can be treated, to all intents and 
purposes, as part of the realln." 
In other words, it defends and justifies the taking possession 
of a certain part of the sea, and perrnanently occupying it for 
the purpose of erecting light-houses. (13 Fur Seal Arbitration, 
Proceedings, p. 337.) 
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Discussion of 1893 attitude.-T'he statement of Sir 
Charles Russell has been held by so1ne to support a claim 
to the extension of mariti1ne jurisdiction by the erection 
of a lighthouse or other structure in the high sea. Sir 
Charles \vas probably not giving special attention to this 
aspect of the question, but his remarks strictly construed, 
and any staten1ent in regard to fundamental rights Inust 
be strictly construed, ·would scarcely "\Varrant such con-
struction. \Vhat Sir Charles said \Vas that, 
it (the light-house) becomes, as far as that lighthouse is con-
cerned, part of the territory of the nation which has erected it, 
and, a s part of the territory of the nation which has erected it, 
it has, incident to it, all the rights that belongs to the protection 
of ter ritory-no 1nore and no less. 
and later he says, in reply to a question-
I answer n1y friend's case by saying that ordinary territorial 
la\v would apply to it£-there is no reason why any different terri-
torial law should apply. 
This seems Inerely to affirm that the lighthouse itself 
is under the territorial jurisdiction and not to imply an 
extension of n1aritin1e juris¢liction. 
Westlake's opinion.-Referring to this statement of Sir 
Charles Russell in his discussion of territorial \Yaters, 
Professor Westlake said : 
The area of the land on which a strip of littoral sea is dependent 
is Of no consequence in principle. Guns might be planted on a 
small island, and we presume that even in practice an island, 
without reference to its actual means of control over the neigh-
bouring water, carries the soYereignty over the same width of the 
latter all round it as a piece of mainland belonging to the s:une 
state would carry. But an extrenw case may be put of something 
which can scarcely be called an island. "If," Sir Charles Rus~ell 
said when arguing in the Behring sea arbitration, "a lighthouse 
is built upon a rock or upon piles driven into the bed of the sea, 
it becomes as far as that lighthouse is concerned part of the 
territory of the nation which has erected it, and, as part of the 
territory of the nation which has erected it, it has incident to 
it all the rights that belong to the protection of territory-no more 
and no less." It is doubtful from the context whether the eminent 
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advocate meant bY this to claim more for the lighthouse in its 
territorial character than immunity from violation and injury, of 
course together with the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of 
its state. It \Vould be difficult to admit that a mere rock and 
building, incapable of being so armed as really to control the 
neighbouring sea, could be made the source of a presumed occupa-
tion of it converting a large tract into territorial water. It might 
however be fair to claim an exclusive right of fishing so near the 
spot that, without the light, fishing there would have been too 
dangerous to be practicable. (International Law, part I, p. 186.) 
Professor Westlake's doubt as to the exclusive right to 
fishing n1ay be argun.ble, but if the lighthouse has been 
constructed for the purpose of security to local fisheries, 
elain1s 1night be n1ade accordingly, even though such a 
contention of exclusive right does not seen1 to have been 
made in case of lightships. 
Later opinion.-,Vhile in the last edition of Oppen-
heiin's International La,v as revised by himself there 
is no co1nment upon Sir Charles Russell's statement, there 
is in the Roxburgh (third edition) edition of 1920 a 
reference to this statement, which is son1e:\vhat abbrevi-
ated in the edition of 1928 prepared by Dr. MeN air, as 
follo,vs: 
Since the most important lighthouses ~J re built outsir1e the 
n1aritilne belt of the littoral States, the question arises whether 
a State can claim a maritime belt around its lighthouses in the 
open sea-a question which Sir Charles Russell, the British 
Attorney-General, in the Behring Sea Seal Fisheries case answered 
in the affirmative. It is tempting to con1pare such lighthouses 
with islands, and argue in favour of a 1naritime belt around 
them; but I believe that such an identification is 1nisleading, and 
that lighthouses n1ust be treated on the same lines as anchored 
lightships. Just as a State 1nay not claim sovereignty over a 
maritime belt around an anchored lightship, so it may not make 
such a claim in the case of a lighthouse in the open sea. (1 
International Law, 4th ed., p. 403.) 
Dr. M. F. Lindley, writing in 1925 and also referring 
to Sir Charles Russell's remarks, says: 
Now, considering first the question of sovereignty over the sur-
rounding water, although we agree with \Vestlake's conclusion on 
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this point, it appears to us to rest upon other grounds. A control 
sufficient to render the occupation effective could, apparently, be 
exercised by placing an ar1ned vessel upon the part of the sea 
in question, so that the fact that it 1nay be impossible to fortify 
the lighthouse would not, by itself, be sufficient to render the 
surrounding water inappropriable. The principle underlying this 
case appears to be the san1e as that governing the one we have 
just considered, and if a rock or barren island is not occupied 
for its own sake, but 1nerely to facilitate fishing and navigation 
in the surrounding ocean, it does not appear that this would be 
a sufficient justification for extending the sovereignty of the 
occupying State over those waters. 
Secondly, in regard to the exclusive right of fishing, it is 
difficult to see how the 1nere building of the lighthouse, which 
is not sufficient to render the surrounding waters territorial, 
takes this case out of the operation of the principle underlying 
the decision in the Behring Sea Arbitration. Although the fishing 
off the Seven Stones at the n1outh of the Bristol Channel would 
be dangerous without the lightship which Trinity House main-
tains there, no exclusive right in the fishing is claimed for British 
fishermen, and there appears to be no difference in principle be-
tween establishing a lightship upon a barren rock or upon piles 
driven into the sea bottom. The case appears to be one to be 
dealt with by Convention between the States interested, for which 
precedents are not lacking. (Acquisition and Governn1ent of 
Backward Territory in International Law, p. 67.) 
B eaoons.-Beacons, buoys, and markers of various 
types are novv con1mon in parts of the sea where there 
are dangerous reefs and shoals, but it would not be 
claimed that these extend the coastline of the state which 
1nay place these aids to navigation. Indeed they are 
not infrequently changed in location, usually with notice 
to mariners without any contention that the jurisdiction 
of the state making the change has relocated its terri-
torial waters jurisdiction. Changing currents, shoals, 
etc., may make necessary the marking of new channels, 
Lut not the extension or n1odification o£ the jurisdiction 
of the state ·undertaking the 1narking of the channel. It 
r.aay be affirmed that the placing of beacons, buoys, etc., 
on submerged locations does not extend the marginal sea 
jurisdiction but the jurisdiction over the marker itself 
./ 
BEACONS 
is in the state or states locating and caring :for its. 
upkeep. 
Case of United Slates v. Henning, 1925.-The question 
as to 'vhether a beacon built upon a submerged reef 
'vould be the point fron1 which the coastline should be 
measured was raised in the case of the V nited States Y .. 
Henning et al. in 1925. In the decision it was said: 
The point where the Fra~nces E. was anchored was 12 miles. 
west of Sea Horse Reef beacon on the west coast of Florida and 
about 16 1niles west of the coast of Florida. This beacon is a 
structure built on a shallow reef, and projecting up out of the 
water, but the reef is wholly under water. 
It is contended by the government that this beacon is under 
the terms of section 3 of article 2 of this treaty ( 43. Stat. 176), 
to be treated as the point from which the one hour's time is to 
bE: estilnate<l. I cannot concede this construction. The language 
is: "The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised 
at a greater distance frmn the coast of the United States, its 
territories or possessions, than can be traversed in one hour." 
The be-acon certainly is a possession of the United States, but 
these words properly mean and must be held to mean as if writ-
tHl the distance " from the coast of the United States, the coast of 
its territories, or the coast of its possessions ", for it was fro In 
the coast the time was to~ be measured. The words undoubtedly 
had reference to such territories or possessions as Porto Rico and 
Hawaii. It certainly had no reference to marine structures 
erected in the water and having no coast. (United States v. 
Henning et al., (1925), 7 F. (2d) 488, 4891.) 
While the decision in this case was reversed in 1926 
(13 F. (2d) 74), probably the same position as to the 
nature of jurisdiction as dependent upon the beacon 
would be ·maintained. 
Statu-s of air.-The Convention of 1919 relating to air 
navigation 'vhich is generally accepted provides in its 
first article that " the contracting states recognize that 
every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty in the 
air space above its territory and territorial waters ", and 
this principle has been e1nbodied in other conventions. 
There has been some debate as to whether the air over 
the high seas is res nullius or res oomJJnunis. The air 
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above the sea 'vould follo'v the nature of the sea. Prac-
tice and opinion see1ns to favor the res comn~unis doc-
trine under 'vhich the high sea 1nay be used for naviga-
tion, but 1nay not be exclusively appropriated. There 
arises the question as to whether states having no, sea-
coast may have a right to use the sea. equally with states 
having seacoast. A considerable degree of equality has 
been admitted in the right of states having no seacoast to 
issue docu1nents and certificates to vessels under. their 
flags " in conformity with the general practice observed 
in the principal 1naritime states." (Art. 273. Treaty 
of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919; see also Barcelona 
Declaration, April 20, 1921, 1924 Naval 'Var College, 
Int. La 'v Docu1nents, p. 83; 7 League of Nations Treaty 
Series, 1921, p. 7 4.) It is argued that if such states have 
a right to fly their flags on vessels, then they must ha Ye 
rights of coast states in the air above the high seas, 
which see1ns difficult to deny. 
Liability for wse.-While a part of the field of inter-
national la'v of aviation 'vas covered in the Convention 
on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, October 13, 1919, 
the field of private la'v did not receive corresponding 
attention as regards foreign aircraft. In 1925 the French 
Government took steps tovvard calling a conference for 
considering the private internationalla'v of aviation and 
the Cornite International Technique d'Experts Ju.ridiques 
Ac?'iens came into existence in 1927. This Committee 
has dra,vn up conventions for consideration by interna-
tional conferences. 
In the proposed conventions the fact that the sub-
jacent area 'vith its population and property does not 
voluntarily co1ne into relation to an aircraft is generally 
recognized and the responsibility for damage is placed 
upon the aircraft. This liability is affirrned in the latest 
proposed conYention even though there 'Yas no inten-
tional culpability on the part of the aircraft. Of course 
da1nage due to a fault of the injured party is excepteft 
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e.g., if a person is trespassing on a landing field. reserved 
for aircraft. 
It is evident that vvhile there 1nay be analogies betvveen 
air and n1arine navigation, and air and land transporta-
tion, yet there are many aspects 'vhich are not analogous. 
It is true that there may be analogies between craft. 
lighter than w·ater and craft lighter than air, but the 
analogies are limited in scope. Wheel vehicles respon-
sive to the force of gravity are only in small measure 
comparable to 'vinged or motor-driven vehicles coul}ter-
acting some of the forces to 'vhich the 'vheeled vehicles 
respond. 
I nterna1tional significance.-The international signifi-
cance of aerial navigation is evident in the growing net-
'vork of treaties and conventions particularly since 1919. 
'1'he proposition of France to the Disarma1nent Confer-
ence in 1932 as to the internationalization of civil avia-
tion e1nphasized another aspect and other possibilities 
of aviation. 'Vhether the French proposition vvould 
result as prophesied is doubted by son1e. Certainly tho 
consequences are not as si1nple as son1e seem to believe. 
Definitions.-In la,vs and conventions definitions have 
been adopted but these are not yet entirely unifor1n. In 
general, the ter1n " aircraft " includes any contrivance 
capable of aerial flight and would cover flying machines, 
balloons, gliders, etc., constructed for flight but not such 
contrivances as parachutes and projectiles. 
The ter1n " air space " is usually held to be the space 
above any specified area and national air space is that 
above the area over which a state exercises jurisdiction. 
Detailed regulations as to rules of the road, signals, 
markings, landing procedure, personnel, etc., are already 
co1nn1on. International conventions on these matters are 
now numerous and usually aim to facilitate communica-
tion. 'Vi thin the United States it has been necessary that 
1nany Federal regulations should be made as to aerial 
navigation as a part of interstate con1merce, even to the 
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n1odification of State regulations 'vhich n1ight hamper 
interstate flying. The recognition of the principle which 
has thus been applied in American interstate aviation 
may similarly be essential in international aviation. 
R 1ules for air navigation.-Thus far detailed rules for 
air navigation have been largely national, though some 
conventional agreements have been made both bilateral 
and multilateral. 
Some of the national legislation has been detailed in 
specifications and regulations. Nearly all contain some 
definitions of which the Chilean Decree of May 15, 1931, 
is a type. This decree defines " aerodrome " as " any area 
of land or water specially arranged for the accommoda-
tion, departure, or landing of aircraft." (Int. Commis-
sion for Air Navigation, Bul~etin of Information, no. 526, 
art. 34, p. 7.) 
Portuguese decree, Ootober 25, 1.{),30.-In 1930 Portugal 
issued a decree promulgating detailed rules in regard to 
aerial navigation. These rules which are full and classi-
fied defined aircraft. By " aerodrome " the rules (article 
7) understand any land or 'vater surface set apart for the 
taking off or arrival of aircraft. At an airport, as dis-
tinguished from an "aerodrome", there "\vould be also 
additional facilities for revenue and other formalities as 
in a 1naritime port. 
Conventional regulation.-Early projects in regard to 
regulation and control of aerial flight looked to uni-
form international regulation. No such hope has been 
realized. More than 30 bilateral conventions have, how-
ever, e1nbodied differing rules, but as yet these are not so · 
unlike that they cannot be reconciled. 
~1ost of the conventions recognize the sovereignty of 
the state in the air above its jurisdiction, 'vhich includes 
its territorial sea~ At the same time there is an attempt 
to maintain freedom of innocent passage though not all 
aircraft are granted passage even in time of peace. In 
general, equality of rights is conceded to all states. Reg~ 
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istra tion, etc., is to a large degree standardized. Fre-
quent conferences are aiming at greater uniformity as 
air lines spread over more extended areas. 
Treaties upon aviation.-In recent years many treaties 
relating to air navigation have been concluded. These 
vary in their provisions but are usually reciprocal in 
granting privilege of flight in tin1e of peace for private 
aircraft of the parties. 
An air-navigation arrangement between the United 
States and the Nether lands, of which notes of agreement 
were exchanged, November 16, 1932, contains the fol-
lo,ving: 
ARTICLE 1 
For the purpose of the present arrangement (a) the term 
"territory" shall be understood to mean the United States of 
America, the Netherlands and likewise possessions, territories, and 
colonies oYer which they respectively exercise jurisdiction, in-
cluding territory over sea and territorial waters; and (b) the 
term "aircraft" shall be understood to embrace private aircraft 
and commercial aircraft including state aircraft used exclusively 
for commercial purposes. 
ARTICLE 2 
(1) Each of the Parties to this arrange1nent undertakes in time 
of peace to grant liberty of innocent passage above its territory 
to the aircraft of the other party, provided that the conditions set 
forth in the present arrange1nent are observed. 
(2) It is, however, agreed that the establishment and operation 
of regular air routes by an air transport company of one of the 
Parties within the territory of the other Party or across the said 
territory, with or without intermediary landing, shall be subject 
to the prior consent of the other Party given on condition of 
reciprocity and at the request of the Party whose nationality 
the air transport company possesses. 
(3) Each Party to this arrangement agrees that its consent for 
operations over its territory by air transport companies of the 
other Party may not be refused on unreasonable or arbitrary 
grounds. The consent can be made subject to special regulations 
relating to aerial safety and public order. 
( 4) Each of the Parties to this arrangement may reserve to its 
own aircraft, air com1nerce between any two points neither of 
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which is in a foreign country. Each Party may also reserve to 
its own aircraft pleasure or touring flights starting from an 
aerodrome in its territory and returning to the same aerodrome 
for which a transportation charge would be 1nade. (Department 
of State, Press Releases, Publication No. 409, Dec. 17, 1932, 
p. 434.) 
Regulation of air ser,vice.-vVith more than 100,000 
1niles of air lines in regular operation, and as some of 
these make easily accessible points formerly difficult of 
access, states have been constrained to adapt their la,vs 
1 o these new conditions. This has been done in part 
by do1nestic legislation and in part by international 
agreement. For the ·carriage of foreign mail, interna-
6onal arrangements have become necessary. The results 
of national surveys, meteorological data, and other in-
formation has been supplied by one state to others as 
well as Inuch other data which might be of value in plan-
n]ng air service. The use of the radio has added much 
to the efficiency and safety of this service. 
'fhe regulations thus far adopted and those proposed 
sho'v conclusively that the rules for navigation at sea 
do not and cannot apply to any great extent to aviation. 
It is unfortunate for that reason that so Inany maritime 
terms have crept into the language of aviation, for 
analogies in fact are often re1note. 
A ne'v set of problems may arise in regard to hydro-
planes, if their range of flight is confined to the air above 
the sea. Questions have been raised as to 'v hether these 
are not in all respects to be treated as 1naritime vessels 
as respects belligerent and as respects neutral rights. 
Questions have also been raised as to 'vhether 'vhen on 
the 'vater maritime law should apply and when in the 
air aerial law should apply. Hydroplanes are, ho"~ever, 
except for the place of con1ing to a stop, so nearly iden-
tical to aircraft 'vhich alights on land that there is no 
reason entitling them to , different treabnent. 
Report on air armam~ents, 193tE.-In deter1nining the 
treatment of aircraft in the Disarmament Conference in 
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1932, it was necessary to have a definite idea as to the aid 
and service which the different types might render. In 
a resolution of April 22, 1932, the Air Commission was 
asked by the General Commission the :following 
questions: 
What are the air armaments: 
(a) Whose character is the most specifically offensive ; 
(b) 'Vhich are the most efficacious against national defence; 
(c) 'Vhich are the most threatening to civilians? 
Although it was made clear in the discussions in the Air Com-
mission that the offensiveness of the air arma1nents, their efficacy 
against national defence, and the threat that they represent to 
civilians vary considerably on account of the wide differences in 
the geographical position of different countries, the location of 
their vital centres, and the state of their anti-aircraft defences, 
and that any qualitativ~ question in connection with air arma-
ments is closely bound up with quantitative considerations, the 
Commission ·found it possible to set down certain general conclu-
sions, which fonn Part I of this report. The Commission also 
undertook a technical study of the efficacy and the use of air 
armaments. The results of this study form Part II of the present 
report. Part III contains several comments in regard to Parts 
I and II, and Part IV contains statements by various delegations, 
with an introduction. 
PART I. 
These conclusions are as follows : 
I. (a) All air armaments can be used to some extent for of-
fensive purposes, without prejudice to the question of their 
defensive uses. 
If used in time of peace for a sudden and unprovoked attack, 
air armaments assume a particularly offensive character. In 
effect, before the State victim of the aggression can take the de-
fensive measures den;:tanded by the situation, or before the League 
of Nations or States not involved in the conflict could undertake 
preventive or mediatory action, the aggressor State might in 
certain eases be able rapidly to obtain military or psychological 
results, such as would render difficult either the cessation of hos-
tilities or the re-establish1nent of peace. 
(b) Civil aircraft, to the extent that they Inight be incorpo-
rated into the armed force of a State, could in varying degrees 
subserve miliary ends. 
(c) Independently of the offensive character which air arma-
ments nmy derive from their use, their capacity for offensive 
action depends on certain of their constructional characteristics. 
3628-34--6 
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(d) The possibilities of offensive action of aeroplanes carried 
by aircraft-carriers or war'ships equipped with landing-platforms 
(or landing-decks) must be regarded as being increased by the 
mobility of the vessels which carry th~m. 
(e) The capacity for offensive .action of air armaments result-
ing from ·such constructional characteristics should first be con-
sidered from the point of view of the efficacy of such armaments 
against national defence, and secondly from the point of view of 
the threat offered thereby to the civilian population. 
E!FFIOACY AGAINST NAT'IONAL DE!FENCEI 
II. (a) The aircraft forming a part of the air armaments of a 
country that may be regarded as most efficacious against national 
defence are those which are capable of the most effective direct 
action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare of 
any kind. 
(b) The effic~cy against national d~fence of an aircraft forming 
part of such armaments, and considered individually, depends 
upon its useful load and its capability of arriving at its objective. 
(c) The efficacy against national defence of means of warfare 
of every kind launched from the air depends upon the material 
effect which they are capable of producing. 
THREAT TO CIVIL POPULATION 
III. (a) The aircraft forming part of the air armaments of a 
country which can be regarded as the 1nost threatening to the 
civil population are those which are capable of the most effective 
direct action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare 
of any kind; this efficacy depends primarily upon the nature of 
the means of warfare employed and the manner in which they 
are e1nployed. 
(b) The degree of threat to the civil population represented 
by an aircraft forming part of those armaments, and considered 
individually, is in proportion to its useful load and its capa-
bility of arriving at its objective·. 
(c) The 1neaus of warfare, intended to be dropped from the 
air,. \vhich are the most threatening to the civil population are 
those which, considered individually, produce the most extended 
action, the greatest moral or material effect; that is to say, those 
which are the n1ost capable of killing, \vounding and immobilising 
the inhabitants of centres of civil population or of demoralising 
then1. so far as concerns immediate consequences, and so far as 
<·oncerns future consequences, of impairing the vitality of human 
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beings. Among these means the Commission specially mentions 
poisonous gases, bacteria and incendiary and explosive appliances. 
IV. The useful load of aircraft and their capability of arriving 
at their objective are determined by a large number of variable 
factors. 'Vhere useful load is concerned, the Air Commission 
has noted among these variable factors, for purposes of examina-
tion, the unladen weight, the horsepower and the wing area for 
aeroplanes, the volume and the horsepower for dirigibles. 
(League of Nations Documents. Series IX, Disarmament, IX, 
48. No. Conf. D. 123, p. 1.) 
In part II the technical study showed that the " offen-
sive character of air armaments can not be determined 
arbitrarily", " depends upon the objectives ", etc. 
Part III contained comments upon the conclusions em-
bodied in part I. 
The United States 'vith Portugal cast votes against 
part I, conclusion I (d). There were 16 a~rmative 
votes. 1'he delegation of the United States made the 
follo,ving declaration: 
The delegation of the United States considers that the state-
ment in Paragraph I (d) as to the increased possibility of offen-
sive action of ship-based aircraft is inappropriate for inclusion in 
a report which deals with aircraft generally and which does not 
otherwise discuss specific types of aircraft of the influence of the 
base of action upon their offensive capabilities. 
"One of the tests already contained in the report is that of 
capability of arriving at an objective. Thus the mobility feature 
of ship-based aircraft if already taken into account and any 
further reference in the report which might give the impression 
that individual ship-based aircraft are more specifically offensive 
than individual aircraft taking off from bases close to land 
frontiers is misleading." 
The Portuguese delegation associated itself with this declara-
tion, and the United I{ingdom delegation stated that it shared 
the views therein expressed. (Ibid., p. 6.) 
Part IV, which set forth national opinions, gave evi-
dence of wide differences of view ranging from that of 
states which had no air forces to that of states maintain-
ing large air forces. 
Terminology.-The terminology to designate a landing 
place for aircraft on the high sea has been discussed from 
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t1me to ti1ne and various terms have been proposed. 1'1H~ 
following have been among the many suggestions: 
" flo a tin o· island " " marine airport" " airport in tltc 
b ' ' 
high sea", "marine aerodrome", etc., but the term "~ea~ 
ciro1ne ", 'vhile not ideal, has the advantage of being a 
single 'vord of 'vhich the parts are associated 'vith the 
location and 'vith the use. 
Need of 1narine aerodrrornes.-There has been a gro,v-
ing recognition that aerodromes 'vould be needed at sea 
to a degree son1e,vhat comparable to the need ·on land 
if transoceani"c aviation is to develop rapidly. The 
transoceanic flights have in their early atte1npts gener-· 
ally been of a spectacular character. For many reasons 
such flights have involved great risk and expense. Non-
stop flights are at present regarded as noneconon1ie 
nndertakings. I£ transoceanic aviation is to becon1e 
co1nmon it seems essential that seadro1nes be located. 
!11-rjJortance of sead1?o1nes.-The proposals for locating 
seadro1nes have been prin1arily based on arguments for 
securing and increasing oYersea aviation. It has been 
esti1nated that even a 1noderate nun1ber of seadro1nes in 
the Atlantic Ocean 'vould increase trans-Atlantic avia-
tion 100 percent. These seadromes, presumably equipped 
for landing, taking off, refueling, or rep.airing, might 
likewise be of great service to sub1narines and other 
vessels. 
The location of seadromes 'vould "be a matter of con-
cern to all states if these are to be under national control 
as the strategic conditions of mariti1ne states may be 
greatly changed by such stations. It is entirely possible 
that con1mercial routes would indicate one location while 
strategic reasons would indicate another. Manifestly 
also the high seas 1nay not be appropriated to the ex-
clusive use of any state or corporation. 
Types of proposals.-Manifestly high sea aerodro1nes~ 
if established, must be under responsible control. That 
such aids to aviation shoul(l be subject to the vagaries 
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of private control, operation, and competition, must be 
considered undesirable. That it should be permitted to 
any state to establish a seadro1ne off the coast of another 
state for the purpose of carrying on hostilities against it 
"\Vould seen1 unreasonable. These and other reasons have 
led to propos:tions varying in nature. It has been pro-
posed that seadron1es should be assimilated to islands 
but the better opinion see1ns to be that seadromes are 
not to be assi1nilated to islands. Son1e have ·wished the 
con1plete control to be vested in the state of the construc-
tor. Such a proposition has been denied as i1npracticable 
by others. Representatives of non1naritime states have 
claimed the same right to construct seadro1nes as states 
ha v.:ng seacoast. rrhis has been denied by some on the 
ground that an inland state would have no right of 
access to the sea, except by convention or grace, of coast 
states. It has been suggested that the League of Nations 
be entrnstecl "\vith the ad1ninistra tion of the systen1 of 
seadron1es but representatives of non1ne1nbers have raised 
objections. In general, proposals have been met with 
counter proposals and objections but progress has been 
made in clarification of ideas. 
1\.t the Disarn1ament Conference at Geneva, in 1932, 
the proposals ranged from that of co1nplete abolition of 
all 1nilitary aviation and internationalization of all civil 
aviati0n to a gradual reduction of air forces ·with the 
establishing of rules for their control and operation. 
The proposal to transform air forces into an interna-
tional police "\Yas favored by some states. 
The international action of civil aviation received 
1nuch attention at the Disar1na1nent Conference. The 
Preparatory Con11nission of the League of Nations in 
the Draft Convention had introduced the follo·winD' 
~ 
artiC'les: 
ART. 25. The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, 
capable of use in war, in cominission and in immediate reserve 
in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Con-
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tracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for sueh 
Party in the corresponding columns of Table I annexed to tlli~ 
Chapter. 
The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable 
of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the 
land, sea and air fonnations organised on a n1ilitary basis of 
each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures 
laid down for such· Party in the corresponding colutnns of Table 
II annexed to this Chapter. 
AnT. 26. The nutuber, total horse-power and t9tal volume of 
dirigibles, capable of use in war, in com1nission in the land, sea 
and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties 
shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the con·e-
sponding columns of Table II annexed to this Chapter. 
The nun1ber, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles 
capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air 
forn1ations organised on a military basis of each of the High 
Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for 
such Party in the corresponding columns of Table IV annexe<l 
to this Chapter. 
ART. 27. Horse-power shall be measured according to the fol-
lowing rules * * * 
The volu1ne of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic 1netres. 
ART1• 2.8. 
1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain fron1 prescribing 
the embodiment of 1nilitary features in the construction of civil 
aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for 
purely civil purposes, nwre particularly with a view to providing 
the greatest possible measure of security and the n1ost economic 
return. No preparations shall be made _in civil aircraft in time 
of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose 
of converting such aircraft into military aircraft. 
2'. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil 
aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for 
military purposes. They undertal\:e to authorise only as a pro-
visional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, 
and the e1nployment of Inilitary aviation material in, civil avia-
tion undertakings. Any such personnel or military n1aterial which 
may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever nature shall 
be included in the liinita tion applicable to the High Contracting 
Party concerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26, of the 
present Convention, as the case n1ay be. 
3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, 
directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for n1ilitary 
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Jmrposes instead of being established for economic, administrative 
0r social purposes. 
4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far 
as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil 
aviation undertakings in the different countries and to confer 
together to this end. (League of Nations Publication IX. Dis-
armament, 1930. IX. 8. No. C. 687 lVI. 288., p. 14.) 
Evident desiderata.-It is evident that high-sea aero-
dromes will be essential to convenient and safe trans-
oceanic aviation. These should have a degree of unifor1n 
character and administration. They should, when under 
neutral flags, not increase the war risk of states. High-
sea aerodromes should be open to all aircraft on equal 
terms. The threat of or existence of hostilities should 
not affect the service of the aerodromes. These should 
not be fortified or adapted for 'var use. Exclusive con-
trol should not be in any one state though a degree of 
national control 1nay be essential in order to secure the 
necessary investlnent of public or of private capital. It 
may be easier starting de novo to obtain satisfactory 
agree1nents for the construction and Inaintenance of high-
sea aerodro1nes than would be possible if many such 
structures were already in existence. The analogy is 
closer to the status of a lightship than to that of an 
island. 
Seadro1nes not ships.-If a seadrome could be put in 
the category of ships or vessels, the law applicable would 
be fairly "rell defined. It is true there may be certain 
analogies to a ship used as an aircraft carrier, but the 
aircraft carrier is by its very nature constructed for the 
purpose of navigation which is a common criterion in 
distinguishing ships from. other structures. The prime 
value of a seadrome would be permanence of location in 
order that aircraft could plan their voyages with refer-
ence to its location. In the case of 0 ope v. Vallette 
Dry Dock Oo1npany, 1887, which involved a. suit for 
salvage of a dry dock, Mr. Justice Bradley, vvho ren-
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dered the decision 1n the Supreme Court of the United 
States, said: 
'Ve ha Ye no hesitation in saying that the decree of the Circuit 
Court was right. A fixed structure, such as this drydock is, not 
used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage 
service, any more than is a wharf or a warehouse when project-
ing into or upon the water. The fact that it floats on the water 
does not make it a ship or vessel, and no structure that is not 
a ship or vessel is a subject of salvage. A ferry bridge is gener-
ally a floating structure,, hinged or chained to a wharf. This 
n1ight be the subject of salvage as well as a drydock. A saEor's 
floating bethel, or meeting house, moored to a wharf, and kept 
in place by a paling of surrounding piles, is in the same ca te-
gory. It can hardly be contended that such a structure is 
susceptible of salvage service (119 U.S. 625, 627.) 
Sqme have suggested that seadro1nes be treated as ships 
and be assimilitated to aircraft carriers. 
In the case of Evansville Co. v. Chero Cola Co., 19126, 
the court considered whether a ·wharf boat, not capable 
of use as a means of transportation could be a vessel 
and said, 
The only question presented is whether appellant's wharfboat 
was a "vessel" at the time it sank. It was an aid to river 
traffic, but it 'vas not used to carry freight from one place to 
atJother. It was not practically capable of being used as a means 
of transportation. It served at Evansville as an office warehouse 
and wharf, and was not taken from place to place. The connec-
tions with the water, electric light and telephone systems of 
the city eYidence a pennanent location. It 11erformed no func-
tion that n1ig:ht not have been perforn1ed as well by an appto-
priate structure on the land and by a floating stage or platform 
pern1anently attached to the land. (271 U.S. 19', 22.) 
From these and other cases, it is evident that a sea-
droine even \vhen located in the high sea \vould not :fall 
into the category of ships \vhich \vould, if neutral, be 
l~able to visit and search and to presentation before a 
prize court. · 
Seadron~es in thne of ttoar.-The peace-tin1e status of 
seaclron1es on the high sea see1ns. in the opinion of the 
1najority of those \vho have giYen set!ous consideration 
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to the Inatter, to be one in \Vhich the jurisdiction in the 
thing itse:£ is in the state to "·hich the seadrome belongs, 
or in the state \vhose subject established the seadro1ne. 
Questions 1nay be raised as to the right o£ a state or o£ 
a citizen to establish a seadron1e on the high sea. It has 
been proposed by son1e that this question be left to the 
League o£ Nations, by others that it be settled by some 
sort o£ an international conference or com1nittee, and by 
others that there be no regulation. Plans £or neutraliza-
tion ha Ye 1net " ·ith the criticism that neutralization gives 
no guarantee in the tin1e o£ \Var in \vhich the neutralizing 
po"·ers are engaged and by the :further criticisn1 that 
neutralization n1ight provide only £or a time o£ \var 
\Yhich might never occur. 
Internationalization proposals have met with n1ore 
support as visualizing the ti1ne o£ peace as \vell as o£ \var 
and as based upon general rather than special considera-
tions. The argtunent n1ay be put :forward that, the high 
sea being ~res convnunis, any use o£ the high sea other 
than that sanctioned by generally accepted practice 
should be by international authorization and under in-
ternational control. This 1nay be supported by the £act 
that seadron1es n1ay be a risk to navigation, that sea-
dron1es 1nay 1nocli£y the conditions o£ established coin-
Inercial and other relations, that seadromes may be o£ 
capital i1nportance in deter1uining strategic plans. 
The argu1nents £or internationalization o£ seadromes 
seem most convincing, particularly as the :further use o:f 
the high sea should be £or the general international good. 
I£ the principle o£ internationalization be accepted, the 
seadro1ne should not be open to any war use during 
hostilities. 
I£ internationalization is not adopted as a principle 
and seaclro1nes are nationalized, neutral seadromes 
should be closed to war use and the treatment o£ bellig-
erent seadromes should be made kno,vn in advance by 
proclamations in order that neutral aircraft may not 
be subject to unkno\vn peril. 
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National control introduces many problems as to re-
sponsibility and liability in the use of seadromes. As 
the seadromes are in the high sea, the states of the 
world may claim an interest above· that in ordinary na-
tional property as the locating of the .. seadrome may be 
regarded as tolerated by grace on account of its general 
service, which service may not be .abandoned or made 
impossible by national exigencies. vVhether a neutral 
seadrome on the high sea may be visited and searched, 
and then treated according to what the visit and search 
seemed to disclose, is to restore a type of quarter-deck 
court that has been usually viewed with disfavor by 
courts and also by military officers concerned as being 
foreign to their duties and profession. If neutral sea-
dromes might be seized and occupied by belligerents on 
the ground of assumed nonfulfillment of the laws of 
neutrality, many abuses may arise which might involve 
serious legal and other complications. 
While there has been considerable attention given to 
the status of landing stations for aircraft at sea in time 
of peace, there has been compa~atively little attention 
given to their status in time of war. So1ne European 
conferences upon aviation laws have given incidental 
consideration to certain aspects of this matter. In recent 
years many have thrown aside the laws of war as being 
negligible on the premise that there would be no more 
'var, but, however desired this may be, a "\v.arless world 
is not yet assured, and under these circumstances war, 
if it co1nes, should be regulated to attain its ends with 
the least possible loss of life and property. So long as 
there is risk of war, it is evident that seadromes 1nay be 
exceptionally exposed to its risks whether the seaclro1ne 
be under a belligerent or under a neutral flag. 
If the seadrome be under a belligerent flag in absence 
of special regulations to the contrary, it "\Yould be liable 
to treatinent as ene1ny property at sea. During the Span-
ish-An1erican 'Var lighthouses "\Yere not regarded as in-
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violable, and during the vVorld War, 1914-18, lighthouses 
and lights 'vere under national control. Belligerents ex-
tinguished both their own and opponent's lights, though 
not aiming attacks against opponent's lights as such. 
Neutrals also gave notice of special regulations. Buoys 
and buoy markings were also ·soinetJ rnes changed. It is 
not to be expected that a state would maintain aids to 
facilitate the 1novements against itself by its enemy 
forces, and a neutr~l state 1nay wish to take measures 
to a void violations of its neutrality. 
The direct risk from the existence of seadromes might 
be much greater than from lighthouses or lightships. If 
a state can assume full and unr~gulated jurisdiction over 
a seadrome which it or its subjects has constructed in 
the high seas, then the seadrome may be treated as bel-
ligerent or neutral, according as the state is belligerent 
or neutral. Indeed the construction and locating of sea-
droines n1ight under such national control become a mat-
ter of strategic planning for states and under the present 
tendency to per1nit states 'vhich have no seacoast to lo-
cate airports on the high sea, 1night introduce novel prob-
len1s of offense and defense. 
Artificial exte1wions of land.-The extension of terri-
tory by construction of 'vharves, dykes, breakwaters, etc., 
along a river is per1nissible so long as it works no dam-
age to other riparian states. If the boundary line is 
already established by convention, it remains the same; 
and if the boundary has been regarded as the thahveg, 
it si1nilarly ren1ains unchanged. 
Artificial extensions of land into the high sea without 
causing da1nage to another state have been regarded as 
legiti1nate use of the sea. So far as the sea. belongs to 
no state, there is no party that can claim to be damaged. 
Indeed, it 1nay be 1naintained that with few exceptions, 
extensions of the land into the high sea are of ad vantage 
to other states, because the purpose would ordinarily be 
with view t.o greater convenience or safety in the use of 
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the sea by all. Even extensions like sea 'valls for the 
purpose o£ prevention o£ the washing a w·ay o£ land 'vould 
be a relatively economic advantage, as thereby the land 
'voulcl be preserved for possible use o£ 1nan. It 'voulcl 
rarely be the case that the extension o£ land into the high 
sea 'Yould be solely to the adYantage o£ the state pri-
Inarily concerned. 
These extensions o£ land area at the san1e ti1ne extend 
territorial and 1naritin1e jurisdictio~, but ·o£ course not 
to an extent to i1npair the rights o£ other states. I£ a 
hrealnYater or other land is extended out,vard £ro1n the 
shore beyond the original 3-mile lin1it, the maritinte 
jurisdiction is extended similarly. In general this gives 
rise to no co1nplications ;' but i£ the break,vater were ex-
tended into a relatively narro··\V strait bet,veen t'vo states~ 
the state upon the opposite side 1night have ground for 
objection. 
Resu1ne.-vVhether seadro1nes 'vill be essential to the 
further development o£ transoceanic flight, or Yfhether 
the perfection o£ aircraft will make seadrori1es unneces-
sary, has been argued. It has usually been achnitted that 
even i£ aircraft beco1ne much Inore fully perfected, there 
n1ay be need for son1e seadron1es in the high seas for 
special purposes. 
Transoceanic flights will ordinarily be between states 
o£ different nationality and some international regula-
tions and understandings 'vill be needed. Such regula-
tions and understandings are to a li1nited extent in exist-
ence and others are under consideration. 
As the doctrine o£ the £reedo1n o£ the seas has after 
centuries o£ struggle been generally recognized, there is 
reluctance to concede to any state in absence. o£ specific 
agree1nent any extension o£ the 1naritin1c jurisdiction. 
National jurisdiction over lightships on the high seas and 
lighthouses built in the high seas upon sub1nerged 
foundations has been tacitly adn1itted in ti1ne o£ peace, 
but later opinion li1nits jurisdiction to the lightship or 
SOLUTION 87 
fjghthouse itself, and maintains that the placing of 
either in the high sea does not automatically extend the 
jurisdiction of the state placing the lighthouse 3 1niles 
out in all directions. 
The filling in of the marginal sea out,vard fron1 the 
coast has, ho,vever, been regarded as correspondingly ex-
tending the n1ariti1ne jurisdiction out,vard in the sea 
proYicled this does not involve an impairing of the juris-
diction of any other state. While the filling in of an 
area about a lighthouse built in the high sea 1nay be per-
Inittcd so far as 1nay be reasonably convenient and need-
ful for the 1naintenance of the light, the jurisdiction of 
the state over the lighthouse is limited to this area. It 
'vould seen1 to be essential also that this national jnris-
<liction extend for the safe custody of the light both 
below· and above this area. 
Opinion seen1s to support the view that if national 
seadro1nes are per1nitted in the high seas, the national 
j uriscliction shall be li1nited to the seadro1ne and the 
space above and belo'v and not to adjacent 'vaters. Fur-
ther, as the seadro1ne is permitted in the high sea as an 
aid to navigation in the ti1ne of peace, its use in time of 
'var shall be limited to that purpose. If it is under 
neutral state jurisdiction, its function is restricted solely 
to the purpose for which it was placed and neutral pro-
tection in adjacent "\Vaters does not extend even to vessels 
'vhich for purposes other than the upkeep of the sea-
dronle are· secured to the seadrome itself. 
SOLUTION 
(a) The visit and search of the neutral merchant ves-
sel is la,vful, as there is no territorial sea around the 
lighthouse built upon a submerged reef 14 miles :fron1 
any coast. No protection, other than to assure the lawful 
exercise of the visit and search, should be given to the 
Nagle. 
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(b) The visit and search of the neutral merchant vessel 
is la,vful, as there is no territorial sea around the land-
ing station for aircraft built upon a submerged reef 20 
1niles from any land. No protection, other than to assure 
the la,vful exercise of the visit and ~earch, should be 
given by neutral vessels of war to the Nagle. 
(c) The visit and search of the Nagle tied to an an-
chored landing station for aircraft of R is la,vful, as 
there is no territorial sea around the landing station for 
aircraft 20 miles from any land. No protection, other 
than to assure the lawful exercise of the visit and search 
should be given to the N a.gle. 
(d) The visit and search of the neutral n1erchant ves-
sel 'vithin 1 mile of a causeway built out from shore to 
n landing station for aircraft is not lawful, as the mer-
chant vessel is within territorial sea and the vessel of 
war of R should afford protection against any violation 
of the neutrality of state R, and should protect the mer-
chant vessel against any violation of its rights within 
these waters. 
(e) All enemy aircraft are liable to capture if non-
military, or to attack if military, when not on or over the 
landing station mentioned in (b) or ( o). Enemy air-
craft may not be lawfully captured or attacked when 
'vithin 3 miles of the causeway or landing station 
rnentioned in ( d') but should be interned. 
